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I. INTRODUCTION 
“‘Critical eyes are sizing you up right now.  Keep your face fresh, 
firm, fit,’ threatened the manufacturers of Williams’ Shaving Cream.”1  Such 
holds true in the streets of today’s society, as technology advances with 
incredible speed.2  A recent article emphasizes the danger of a new Russian 
mobile application, FindFace, which allows a stranger to snap a photo of 
another and, within seconds, learn of that person’s intimate information.3  A 
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Juris Doctor from Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law in 2018.  
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1. SAMANTHA BARBAS, LAWS OF IMAGE: PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN 
AMERICA 91 (2015). 
2. See Ben Guarino, Russia’s New FindFace App Identifies Strangers in a
Crowd with 70 Percent Accuracy, WASH. POST (May 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/18/russias-new-findface-
app-identifies-strangers-in-a-crowd-with-70-percent-accuracy/. 
3. Id. (The Russian identification application, FindFace, was created by
Alexander Kabakov, 29, and Artem Kukharenko, 26, in February of 2016); Shaun Walker, 
Face Recognition App Taking Russia by Storm May Bring End to Public Anonymity, 
1
Cuador: From Street Photography To Face Recognition: Distinguishing Betwe
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
238 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
series of photographs by Russian photographer, Yegor Tsvetkov, titled 
“‘Your Face is Big Data’ . . . shows how powerful facial recognition 
software has become; . . . a complete stranger can find you [with] the click of 
a button.”4  Even more alarming than the danger posed by the application is 
the creators’ inability to control its use.5 
Jurisprudence revolving around the topic of invasion of privacy in 
public spaces generally recognizes that, under most circumstances, one who 
reveals himself in public does not hold a reasonable expectation of privacy.6  
This reasoning is applied to general surveillance systems, such as 
videotaping; and artistic mediums, such as street photography.7  “But facial 
recognition [is] more fraught because, like DNA sequencing, it measures and 
                                                                                                                             
GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016, 4:39 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/17/findface-face-recognition-app-end-
public-anonymity-vkontakte. 
[FindFace] works by comparing photographs to profile pictures on 
Vkontakte, a social network popular in Russia and the former Soviet Union, with 
more than [two hundred] million accounts. . . . In the short time since the launch, 
FindFace has amassed 500,000 users and processed nearly [three million] searches, 
according to its founders . . . . 
Walker, supra.   
[T]he Russian developers say their facial recognition software could be 
used by authorities to fight crime—and, just as easily, score dates with attractive 
strangers. . . . FindFace can identify random passersby with about [seventy] percent 
accuracy, given two conditions:  You need to snap a photo of them, and they need 
to have a social media profile.   
Guarino, supra note 2. 
4. Elena Cresci, Russian Photographer Identifies Strangers with Facial 
Recognition App, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2016, 10:27 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/14/russian-photographer-yegor-tsvetkov-
identifies-strangers-facial-recognition-app (“One girl in the project texted [Yegor Tsvetkov] 
after the publication and said that it was a bad feeling when she saw herself . . . but she fully 
understood [his] idea.”). 
5. See Alex Heath, This Russian Technology Can Identify You with Just a 
Picture of Your Face, BUS. INSIDER (June 21, 2016, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/findface-facial-recognition-can-identify-you-with-just-a-
picture-of-your-face-2016-6 (“‘We see that the advantages for society from our technology are 
more helpful [than harmful],’ said Kabakov.  ‘We can[not] stop this process, but we should 
make it public.’”) (alteration in original). 
6. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort 
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1003–04 (1995).  
“Intrusion is limited in some jurisdictions by the requirement of a physical trespass, and in 
virtually all jurisdictions by the rule that no intrusion can occur in a public place.”  Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
7. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of 
Public Space:  Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1377, 1384 (2004); Nancy Danforth Zeronda, Note, Street Shootings:  
Covert Photography and Public Privacy, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1133, 1135 (2010). 
2
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records biological patterns unique to individuals.” 8   When asked about 
invasion of privacy and loss of anonymity concerns the application’s creator, 
Alexander Kabakov, responded: “A person should understand that, in the 
modern world, he is under the spotlight of technology.  You just have to live 
with that.”9 
The courts have addressed street photographythe capturing of 
another’s image in public spacesas a generally permitted intrusion.10  Part 
of the reasoning behind the legality of street photography is that the 
photographer is merely sharing information—an image—that was already in 
plain sight. 11   Such interpretation lacks the presence of more recent 
technology and needs revision.12  Face recognition not only shares an already 
visible image but also uses that image to share what is not in plain sight—
personal information. 13   Mobile applications that use facial recognition 
technology, such as FindFace, potentially offer strangers an advanced 
platform to begin persecution: 
Kabakov says the app[lication] could revolutioni[z]e 
dating:  “If you see someone you like, you can photograph them, 
find their identity, and then send them a friend request.”  The 
interaction [does not] always have to involve the rather creepy 
opening gambit of clandestine street photography, he added:  “It 
also looks for similar people.  So you could just upload a photo of 
a movie star you like, or your ex[-girlfriend], and then find [ten] 
girls who look similar to her and send them messages.”14 
“In [the] future, the designers imagine a world where people walking past 
you on the street could find your social network profile by sneaking a 
photograph of you, and shops, advertisers, and the police could pick your 
face out of crowds and track you down via social networks.”15  Today, this 
8. Natasha Singer, When No One Is Just a Face in the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/technology/when-no-one-is-just-a-face-
in-the-crowd.html. 
9. Walker, supra note 3.
10. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1131 n.1, 1140.
11. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477–78 (Ala. 1964);
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 538 (2006) (“This 
reasoning was based on the secrecy paradigm—that once something is disclosed to the public, 
it is no longer secret.”). 
12. See Derek J. Sarafa et al., Use of Biometric Information as a Basis for
Civil Liability, LAW360 (May 20, 2015, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/654052/use-of-biometric-information-as-a-basis-for-civil-
liability. 
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invasive technology is available to everyone, not just law enforcement 
agencies, and thus requires regulation.16  Facial recognition technology must 
be regulated for one fundamental distinction, the right to be seen versus the 
right to be recognized.17  While one cannot reasonably expect to not be seen 
in public, it is likely that a majority of people do in fact have a reasonable 
expectation of not being recognized.18   As such, the United States must 
amend its current laws to reflect the growing danger of extreme invasion and 
severe crime.19 
Part II begins by providing a brief legal history of street 
photography, addressing the issue of invasion of privacy.20  Part III continues 
with a discussion of the complex relationship between privacy rights and 
freedom of speech, focusing on the paradox of invasion of privacy in public 
spaces. 21   Part IV describes face recognitionhighlighting the scarce 
attention it receives in the United States and the risks resulting from the 
inaccuracy of face recognition technology. 22   Part V, using street 
photography case law as a starting point, proposes a line of reasoning that 
will help guide litigation dealing with the misuse of facial recognition 
technology in an effort to protect citizens from invasion of privacy. 23  
Finally, Part VI concludes by urging legal reform in order to arrive at a more 
encompassing scheme of privacy laws.24 
                                                     
16. Sarafa et al., supra note 12 (“Despite the proliferation of the use of 
biometrics, there are very few state statutes—and no federal statutes—that create civil 
remedies based on the capture and disclosure of biometric data by private businesses.”). 
17. See Russell Brandon, Someone’s Trying to Gut America’s Strongest 
Biometric Privacy Law, VERGE (May 27, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/27/11794512/facial-recognition-law-illinois-facebook-
google-snapchat. 
18. See Solove, supra note 11, at 496. 
19. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003). 
 Public concern about stalking has compelled all fifty States to pass some 
form of legislation criminalizing stalking.  Approximately one million women and 
371,000 men are stalked annually in the United States.  Stalking is a crime that 
causes serious psychological harm to the victims, and often results in the victim 
experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, sleeplessness, and sometimes, 
suicidal ideations.  Not only is stalking itself a crime, but it can lead to more violent 
crimes, including assault, rape, or homicide. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. See infra Part VI. 
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II. STREET PHOTOGRAPHY AND UNWANTED NOTORIETY
In 1890, The Right to Privacy, a law review article by Supreme 
Court Justice Louis Brandeis and Professor Samuel Warren, revolutionized 
privacy law.25  In the article, the law is recognized to be an ever-evolving 
product of society’s “[p]olitical, social, and economic changes [which] entail 
the recognition of new rights.”26  They remind us that “common law [too], in 
its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”27  The piece was 
inspired, in part, by new privacy concerns sparked by developments in 
photographic technology:   
“Prior to 1884, cameras were large, expensive, . . . 
minimally portable, and they required subjects to sit still for 
extended periods of time to have their photograph taken.”  “In 
1884, the Eastman Kodak Company introduced the snap camera, 
an inexpensive, handheld camera that could take instantaneous 
photographs of people in public.”   “With the [arrival] of this 
technology and the growing popularity of print media, Warren and 
Brandeis . . . [anticipated that covertly] taken photographs would 
threaten the ‘right to be let alone’ . . . .”28   
Just as developments in photographic technology stimulated 
groundbreaking scholarly discussion regarding the laws of privacy, facial 
recognition technology is doing the same in the twentieth century.29 
“Street photography is a tradition nearly as old as photography 
itself.”30  In the early 1880s, as cameras and processing techniques became 
“portable and practical enough to leave the confines of the studio, . . . 
photographers began documenting the world around them” and unlocking 
new levels of privacy concerns.31  In particular, they photographed “urban 
areas where life moved quickly and the urge to record and document change 
and progress was instinctive.”32  In order to fully comprehend the connection 
25. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1135. 
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 193.
27. Id.
28. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1135; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note
25, at 193. 
29. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 196.
30. Emily Airton, London Street Photography Festival, UNDO.NET (June 30,
2011), http://1995-2015.undo.net/it/mostra/122873. 
31. Id.; see also Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1135–37.
32. Airton, supra note 30; see also Charles Hagen, What Walker Evans Saw
on His Subway Rides, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 1991), 
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between street photography and the law, and for purposes of clarity 
throughout this piece, it is important to offer a clear definition.33  According 
to the London Street Photography Festival, “[s]treet photography captures 
people and places within the public domain.”34  More specifically, it is an 
“un-posed, un-staged photography [that] captures, explores, or questions 
contemporary society and the relationships between individuals and their 
surroundings.”35  The essential element in this method of photographing is 
that the scene being captured is unplanned, and, consequentially, un-
consented.36   Thus, with the advent of street photography, the twentieth 
century saw the creation of the “law[s] of public image, and the phenomenon 
of personal image litigation,” a set of cases that address the issue of being 
photographed, and, more importantly, the use of those photographs without 
one’s consent.37 
Walker Evans’ renowned Subway Passengers photography series 
remains one of the earliest examples of street photography during the Great 
Depression era. 38   Using a hidden camera, Evans snapped photos of 
unsuspecting passengers traveling around New York City:  “‘He had the 
camera around his neck, resting on his chest, and a long cable going down 
his sleeve to his hand,’ said Helen Levitt, [ninety-one], . . . who accompanied 
Evans as he took many of the subway portraits.  ‘So he just pointed his chest 
at whomever he wanted to shoot . . . .’”39  The series of photos contains 
people of both genders, all races, and all ages.40  Particularly, in one of the 
portraits, an approximately seven-year-old girl is photographed.41  None of 
the subjects were asked for permission before having their photo taken, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/31/arts/review-photography-what-walker-evans-saw-on-his-
subway-rides.html. 
33. See Airton, supra note 30; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1131 n.1, 1133.
34. Airton, supra note 30.
35. Id.
36. See id.; Philip Gefter, Street Photography:  A Right or Invasion?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/arts/street-photography-a-right-
or-invasion.html?_r=0; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1132, 1140. 
37. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 1–2, 4, 190–91 (“The laws of image protect the
right to control one’s public image, to defend one’s image, and to feel good about one’s image 
and public presentation of self.”). 
38. See Gefter, supra note 36; Hagen, supra note 32; Sewell Chan, Want
Shots Like This? Get a Permit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/07/nyregion/want-shots-like-this-get-a-permit.html. 
39. Chan, supra note 38.
40. Hagen, supra note 32; see also The Streets of New York: American
Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, NAT’L GALLERY ART, 
http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/features/slideshows/the-streets-of-new-york-american-
photographs-from-the-collectio.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
41. See Hagen, supra note 32; The Streets of New York: American
Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 40. 
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manipulated, or sold.42  Moreover, no personal information of the subjects 
was presented.43 
Walker Evans influenced many other artists to record and document 
America in similar ways.44  Andrew Bush’s Vector Portraits series, from 
1989 through 1996, mimics the notion behind Subway Passengers.45  For 
about seven years, Bush would photograph people driving on the highway.46  
In an interview regarding his photographs, he described the series as 
“pictures of people as they were driving on freeways, . . . the notion of 
making a very still image of a person moving at a great velocity, . . . [the] 
notion of movement with a direction.”47  Bush created a moving tripod out of 
his car, “[w]here [he] attached a camera to . . . the passenger side and fixed a 
light so [he] could drive and look through [his] window and get an idea of 
what the framing . . . was.”48  According to Bush, several of his subjects, 
upon noticing that their picture had been taken, chased him, “wanting to 
know whether or not [he] was a detective involved with their divorce.”49  In 
this series, like with most street photography, the subjects were left 
unidentified.50 
Finally, Philip-Lorca DiCorcia, recognized as one of the most 
influential and innovative photographers working today,51 “set up his camera 
on a tripod in Times Square, attached strobe lights to scaffolding across the 
42. See Chan, supra note 38; Hagen, supra note 32; The Streets of New York:
American Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 40. 
43. See Chan, supra note 38; The Streets of New York: American Photographs
from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 40. 
44. See Chan, supra note 38; Hagen, supra note 32.
45. Charles Hagen, Review/Photography; People in Their Cars, Driving
Along, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/27/news/review-
photography-people-in-their-cars-driving-along.html; see also Gefter, supra note 36. 
46. Hagen, supra note 45.
47. See VernissageTV, Andrew Bush:  Vector Portraits.  Car Fetish, Museum
Tinguely at 00:38-00:59, YOUTUBE (July 21, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09as_OM5i-s. 
48. Id. at 1:37–1:53.
49. Id. at 2:44–2:52.
50. See Airton, supra note 30; Chan, supra note 38; Hagen, supra note 45
(Although the photographs do not identify the subjects by their personal names or addresses, 
Bush recorded “where and when each photograph was taken, but also how fast the car was 
going, what the weather was like and so on.”). 
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05,
2006 WL 304832, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006) 
Defendant DiCorcia is a professional photographer for over [twenty-five] years. 
His body of work has drawn international artistic acclaim and has been exhibited in 
fine art museums around the world, including but not limited to, the Museum of 
Modern Art . . . , The Whitney Museum of Art . . . , the Museo National Centrio de 
Arte Reina Sofia . . . , and Art Space Gizo . . . . 
Id. 
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street, and in the time-honored tradition of street photography, took a random 
series of pictures of strangers passing under his lights.” 52   “The project 
continued for two years, [concluding] in an exhibition of a [series of 
seventeen] photographs called Heads at the Pace/MacGill Gallery in New 
York City.”53   DiCorcia was taken to court years later, after one of the 
subjects included in the series filed a lawsuit claiming that his right to 
privacy had been violated.54  Surely, it must have been striking to see his 
image printed in the catalogue, seeing as it was more than just a regular 
photograph:  “They are . . . more intimate, the paradox of standing farther 
away being enhanced intimacy.” 55   Indeed, Mr. Erno Nussenzweig, after 
seeing his photograph in a copy of the exhibition catalogue, was horrified to 
discover that his image had been commodified, exhibited, and sold without 
his knowledge. 56   In Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, 57  the plaintiff filed a 
complaint arguing that not only was DiCorcia’s process of making art, and 
the subsequent exhibition and sale of it, a violation of his personal right to 
privacy, but that these actions also violated his religious beliefs. 58   The 
plaintiff is an Orthodox Hasidic Jew, and for him, the dissemination of his 
representation violated Orthodox religious views, namely the second 
commandment prohibition of graven images. 59   Nussenzweig considered 
DiCorcia’s photograph to be a type of graven image, and such a thing could 
have profound spiritual consequences—all the more so because it was 
52. Gefter, supra note 36.
53. Id.; see also Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3 (None of the seventeen
subjects included in Heads consented to having their photographs taken or exhibited.)  “Pace 
[Gallery] is a photographic and picture gallery that exhibits and sells photographic art . . . .  It 
considers itself one of the nation’s leading art galleries specializing in art photography.” 
Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3. 
54. Id. at *1.
55. Michael Kimmelman, Art in Review; Philip-Lorca diCorcia — ‘Heads’,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/arts/art-in-review-philip-
lorca-dicorcia-heads.html; see Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3. 
56. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3–4; BARBAS, supra note 1, at 190
(“Public figures had no privacy, said some courts, having waived it by pursuing a career in the 
spotlight.  Celebrities assumed the risk of having their privacy invaded when they embarked 
on a path towards public recognition and fame.”); Gefter, supra note 36 (It is important to 
note, for purposes of the law, that Nussenzweig was not famous, or in any way a public 
figure.). 
57. No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006).
58. Id. at *3–4; Gefter, supra note 36 (“The suit sought an injunction to halt
sales and publication of the photograph, as well as $500,000 in compensatory damages and 
$1.5 million in punitive damages.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
59. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *4; Exodus 20:4–5 (King James)
(“Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or [a] likeness of any thing that is in 
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.  Thou shalt 
not bow down thyself to them, or serve them . . . .”). 
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reproduced countless times. 60   According to the Supreme Court of New 
York’s ruling, laws were in place to address Nussenzweig’s claim that 
DiCorcia had violated his right to privacy.61  As “[r]ight of privacy laws are 
intended to defend the average person from unwanted public exposure and 
the potential emotional damage thereby inflected,”62 it appears that the court 
would have ruled in favor of the plaintiff, for he certainly suffered from 
unwanted exposure that resulted in emotional harm and psychological 
distress.63  But the court did not.64  Instead, on February 8, 2006, the court 
entered summary judgment dismissing Nussenzweig’s complaint and 
articulated the tension that exists between experiencing a violation of one’s 
right to privacy in the legal sense, and experiencing such a violation in the 
personal sense. 65   Moreover, it rejected the claim on First Amendment 
grounds that the possibility of such a photograph is simply “the price every 
person must be prepared to pay for . . . [in] a society in which information 
and opinion flow freely.” 66   The court expressed its sympathy for the 
plaintiff, but dismissed his case nonetheless: 
Clearly, [the] plaintiff finds the use of the photograph 
bearing his likeness deeply and spiritually offensive.  The sincerity 
of his beliefs is not questioned by defendants or this court.  While 
sensitive to plaintiff’s distress, it is not redressable in the courts of 
civil law.  In this regard, the courts have uniformly upheld 
Constitutional [First] Amendment protections, even in the face of a 
deeply offensive use of someone’s likeness.67 
III. PRIVACY AND LOCATION
“[C]ourts often view privacy as a binary status—information is 
either completely private or completely public,” with much middle ground to 
60. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *34 (“A catalogue was published to
coincide with the exhibition and the catalogue contained . . . the photograph of plaintiff.  
According to defendant, a substantial number of catalogues were distributed to the public 
during the period of September through October 2001.”). 
61. Id. at *5; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62. Id.
63. See id. at *4–5; Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476
(Ala. 1964) (discussing “[e]vidence offered by [subject of an unconsented photograph] during 
the trial tended to show that the [plaintiff], as a result of the publication of the picture, became 
embarrassed, self-conscious, upset, and was known to cry on occasions.”). 
64. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8.
65. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
67. Id.
9
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be desired.68  Ironically, in Katz v. United States,69 the Supreme Court of the 
United States discussed that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.”70  Later in the discussion, however, it reiterated the common view 
that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”71  An article published by Professor of Law 
Daniel J. Solove attempts to reconcile these complex notions of privacy, 
acknowledging its elusive role in the legal sphere, stating that “[p]rivacy is 
far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and lawmaking, as abstract 
incantations of the importance of privacy do not fare well when pitted 
against more concretely stated countervailing interests.”72  In Nussenzweig, 
the laws of invasion of privacy proved to be deficient in protecting citizens 
from inquisitive lenses in public spaces.73 
Prima facie, the invasion caused by street photography seems 
instinctually threatening to our notions of privacy. 74   Individuals are 
photographed and then exhibited in famous museums, national media, and 
circulated in catalogues all around the world without their consent.75  Their 
images bring fortune to the photographer, for these photographs are often 
sold for thousands of dollars to the interested consumer, and today, they are 
further published on the Internet for all to see—posing new privacy concerns 
altogether.76  The ruling in Nussenzweig begs the public to assuage their 
68. Solove, supra note 11, at 540; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967); McClurg, supra note 6, at 1003–04, 1025. 
69. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
70. Id. at 351; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
71. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. Solove, supra note 11, at 478; see also Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,
162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala. 1964); Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1156 (This notion of freedom of 
expression as being upheld over a person’s right to privacy is seen uniformly throughout case 
law). 
There is a fertile medium in this field of torts for the production of 
conflicts between the right of the individual to be let alone, and the right of the 
public to know—the latter concept being crystalized in our age old concept of 
freedom of speech and of the press.  The right of action for invasion of privacy has 
had to give way to the interest of the public to be informed . . . . 
Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476; Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8 (“Plaintiff 
argues that the use of [his] photograph interferes with his constitutional right to practice his 
religion.  The free exercise clause, however, restricts state action.”). 
73. See Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8.
74. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 1041; Hagen, supra note 45 (“One driver
was so incensed that he chased Mr. Bush for miles, and when he caught up with him at a 
stoplight, grabbed the keys of his car and demanded that he hand over the film.”). 
75. See Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3; Gefter, supra note 36.
76. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *4 (“[The] Pace [Gallery] sold all [ten]
edition prints of the [plaintiff’s] photograph, which were priced between $20,000 and $30,000 
a piece.”); BARBAS, supra note 1, at 210 (“The permanence of online information—the 
inability of online material to ever be fully deleted—is said to pose a profound threat to an 
10
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intuitions and accept an undoubtedly undesirable outcome, as the court 
emphasizes that this case is just one of many “examples illustra[ting] the 
extent to which the constitutional exceptions to privacy will be 
upheldnotwithstanding that the speech or art may have unintended, 
devastating consequences on the subject, or may even be repugnant.” 77  
Currently, the law addresses surveillance but generally does so by focusing 
on where surveillance takes place, rather than on the problematic effects it 
has on its subjects.78  Solove discusses the privacy dilemma when the debate 
involves locationi.e., private versus public areasbecause, “for the tort of 
public disclosure, ‘there is no liability when the defendant merely gives 
further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public.’”79   
Such seems to be the case in the aforementioned instances of street 
photography:  All subjects were captured in an already public area, and, thus, 
because there was no extra personal information added to the series of 
photos, the artists released no new information: 
On the public street, or in any other public place, the 
plaintiff has no right to be alone, and it is no invasion of his 
privacy to do no more than follow him about.  Neither is it such an 
invasion to take his photograph in such a place, since this amounts 
to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially 
from a full written description of a public sight which anyone 
present would be free to see.80 
However, the issue is not so black and white and fails to account for 
the broader truth. 81   Once a photograph is made public, it is made a 
permanent record, and, thus, duplicates the impact that it has on the victim.82  
To hold that nothing new is disclosed when a photograph is disseminated is a 
                                                                                                                             
important aspect of our image rights:  our right to be forgotten.”) (emphasis added); Brian 
Fung, You Could Be in This FBI Facial-Recognition System and Not Even Know It, WASH. 
POST (June 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/16/you-
could-be-in-this-fbi-facial-recognition-system-and-not-even-know-it/ (explaining that not 
surprisingly, Americans are highly concerned about who has access to their personal 
information and the kinds of decisions that are made about them with that information).  
“[People do not] expect that their faces will become part of a permanent digital line-up.”  
Fung, supra. 
77. Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *8. 
78. See Solove, supra note 11, at 549 (“The harm, then, is an impingement on 
the victim’s freedom in the authorship of [his or] her self-narrative, not merely her loss of 
profits.”). 
79. Id. at 540 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977)). 
80. Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964). 
81. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 1042. 
82. Id. 
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misstatement. 83   Each series of photographs discussed above created a 
compilation of information. 84   Although each subject was captured in a 
public place, by making his or her image part of a collage intended for 
publication, each subject suffered from exposure to increased accessibility.85  
Solove recommends considering the extent to which the information is made 
more accessible: 
In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Supreme Court 
recognized the problem of increased accessibility. . . .  In addition 
to concluding that there was a difference between scattered pieces 
of information and a fully assembled dossier, the Court recognized 
that “there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files . . . and a 
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of 
information.”86 
The notion that “visual observation is not a search because the eyes 
cannot be guilty of trespass,” is devastating to our anonymity.87  Fortunately, 
in some narrow instances, courts have reconciled the holding of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy while being physically present in a public space: 
[I]n Nader v. General Motors Corp., Ralph Nader [claimed] that 
General Motors’ automobiles were unsafe.  General Motors [then] 
undertook a massive investigation seeking information discrediting 
Nader.  Among other things, General Motors wiretapped his 
telephone [conversations] and placed him under extensive 
surveillance while in public.  The court recognized that certain 
kinds of public surveillance might amount to an invasion of 
privacy; although observation “in a public place does not amount 
to an invasion of . . . privacy,” in certain instances, “surveillance 
may [also] be so overzealous as to render it actionable.”  The court 
noted:  “A person does not automatically make public everything 
he does merely by being in a public place, and the mere fact that 
83. Id.
84. See Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *3–8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006); The Streets of New York: American Photographs from the 
Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 42; VernissageTV, supra note 47, at 1:00. 
85. See Nussenzweig, 2006 WL 304832, at *3.
86. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 764 (1989); Solove, supra note 11, at 541. 
87. See Susan McCoy, Comment, O’Big Brother Where Art Thou?:  The
Constitutional Use of Facial-Recognition Technology, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 471, 481 (2002). 
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Nader was in a bank did not give anyone the right to try to 
discover the amount of money he was withdrawing.”88 
Therefore, it is clear that although the law focuses on whether 
surveillance occurs in a public or private place, surveillance may be harmful 
in all settings, not just private.89  In Bush’s Vector Portraits, it is not so 
obvious that the photographs captured people in an evidently public space.90  
In fact, all of the subjects were within the confines of their automobiles, and 
“[n]ot surprisingly, some people [felt] threatened by this invasion of the 
semipublic-semiprivate space of their cars.” 91   In 1985, United States v. 
Karo, 92  the Supreme Court of the United States compared invasion of 
privacy as it applied to private and public places:  the home versus an 
automobile.93  While the Court held that a tracking device placed inside a 
person’s home violated the Fourth Amendment, it looked to another case by 
the Supreme Court of the United States in which the police placed an 
electronic tracking device was placed in the plaintiff’s car to track the 
location of the vehicle.94  The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment 
did not apply to the automobile because “[a] person traveling in an 
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy,” since it, “could have been observed by the naked eye.”95  Despite 
this holding and the fact that each of the Vector Portraits were taken in the 
streets of Los Angeles, California, the notion of a person’s car as semipublic-
semiprivate property should hold true.96  Like a housethe ultimate symbol 
of private propertyan automobile should also be considered private 
property in which one holds a reasonable expectation of privacy.97  It is easy 
88. Solove, supra note 11, at 498; see also Nader v. General Motors Corp.,
255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970). 
89. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477–78 (Ala.
1964). 
90. See Hagen, supra note 45.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
93. See id. at 709–12.
94. Id. at 713 (citing to United States. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
95. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. 
96. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392–94 (1985); Knotts, 460 U.S.
at 281–82; Hagen, supra note 45. 
97. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 390–94; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714, 734 (“[P]rivate
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental 
intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is 
prepared to recognize as justifiable.”); Solove, supra note 11, at 496 (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of the house.”) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)). 
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to imagine instances of people engaging in activities inside of their cars that 
they would otherwise not do in public spaces, such as apply make-up, talk 
loudly on the phone, play loud music, or pick their nose.98  This phenomenon 
is due to the perception of being within a protected private area.99  Certainly, 
this is not the case in public streets.100  People walking in Times Square for 
instance, surrounded by others and unprotected by their car windows and 
doors, will likely not take part in these behaviors.101  This is evident in the 
two series themselves.102  Bush’s automobile portraits seem instantly more 
humorous, since they depict people engaging in acts not normally seen in 
public.103  DiCorcia’s, on the other hand, is more solemn for people are 
aware of their surroundings and knowingly restrain their emotions and 
actions.104  Furthermore, simply because the cars featured were in public 
placesi.e., a freewayit should not be the case that the artist is authorized 
to take the photo.105  One cannot say that just because a person’s house is not 
located within a gated community others are free to take photos of the person 
through his or her window.106  Here, it is important to reference Solove’s 
distinction between exposure and disclosure: 
Exposure is related to disclosure in that concealed information is 
revealed to others, but the information is not revealing of anything 
we typically use to judge people’s character.  Unlike disclosure, 
exposure rarely reveals any significant new information that can be 
used in the assessment of a person’s character or personality. 
Exposure creates injury because we have developed social 
98. Solove, supra note 11, at 493–95.
99. See Karo, 468 U.S. at 735; The Streets of New York: American
Photographs from the Collection, 1938-1958, supra note 42 (“Aware that people would 
inevitably compose themselves and alter their expressions if they knew they were being 
photographed, [Walker Evans] did not raise the camera to his eye to look through [his] 
viewfinder, nor did he adjust its focus or exposure, or use a flash.”). 
100. See Solove, supra note 11, at 493, 495–96, 498 (explaining that being 
aware of the general possibility of being watched, without certainty, can cause similar 
phenomenon.  “[B]ased on Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 architectural design for a prison called . . . 
Panopticon,” the Panoptic effect describes this very scenario). 
101. See id. at 493–95. 
102. See Hagen, supra note 45; Kimmelman, supra note 55. 
103. Hagen, supra note 45 (“A pouty blonde in a purple sweater . . . [a] beefy 
tattooed man in ridiculous sunglasses drives a canary-yellow car with delicate racing 
stripes.”). 
104. See Kimmelman, supra note 55. 
105. See Hagen, supra note 45; McClurg, supra note 6, at 991, 995, 1043. 
106. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984); Hagen, supra note 
45.
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practices to conceal aspects of life that we find animal-like or 
disgusting.107 
This distinction is relevant to our photographers:  In Heads, 
DiCorcia discloses information about peoplenamely their faces as they 
walk down the streetand in Vector Portraits, Bush oftentimes exposes the 
individuals by showing them in vulnerable situations.108  One may argue that 
yawning, kissing, or singing in one’s car is hardly animal-like or disgusting 
behavior and is surely different from nudity or sexual acts.109  Nonetheless, 
these examples constitute a set of behaviors that we are often taught to avoid 
in public spaces.110  It is likely that the man would have covered his mouth 
had he known he was being watched, that the couple would not have kissed 
so intimately, and that the girl would not have sang aloud.111  The court 
supported this notion in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,112 in which air 
jets blew up a woman’s dress while she was in a country fair, exposing her 
underwear.113  At that very moment, a photographer for the local newspaper 
took her photograph, and the picture was printed on the front page of the 
paper.114  The newspaper contended that the picture was taken in public, and 
that, accordingly, there was no privacy interest. 115   “However, the court 
concluded that the woman still had a right to be protected from ‘an indecent 
and vulgar’ violation of privacy . . . .”116 
“Understood broadly, these actions are all forms of intrusion.  
Intrusion involves invasions or incursions into one’s life.  It disturbs the 
victim’s daily . . . [life and] solitude . . . .”117  As we have noted, courts 
throughout the United States have not held uniformly in regards to privacy 
laws.118  In some cases, they have ruled solely based on the location of said 
invasion: 
[G]iven . . . the increasing presence of cameras in public, people 
were said to assume the risk of unwanted publicity whenever they 
went outside their homes.  While a person might have a cause of 
107. Solove, supra note 11, at 536 (emphasis added). 
108. See Hagen, supra note 45; Kimmelman, supra note 55. 
109. Solove, supra note 11, at 536–37. 
110. See id.; VernissageTV, supra note 47, at 2:20–2:53. 
111. See Solove, supra note 11, at 495. 
112. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
113. Id. at 476. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 477–78. 
116. Solove, supra note 11, at 538 (quoting Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d 
at 478). 
117. Id. at 553; see also Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476. 
118. See Solove, supra note 11, at 498. 
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action for intrusion upon seclusion if a paparazzo broke down his 
door to get a picture, an individual in a public place was fair game. 
The dominant rule was that ‘photographers on public property may 
take pictures of anyone they want to, objection or not.’119 
In other cases, the court ruled based on the harms that the said 
invasion caused to the victim. 120   Location should not, under any 
circumstances, be the sole factor in making a decision in cases dealing with 
privacy laws.121  As the court in Daily Times Democrat stated, “a purely 
mechanical application of legal principles should not be permitted to create 
an illogical conclusion.”122  There are more significant factors involvedin 
particular, the injury resulting from the invasion and the revelation of new 
private information.123  Especially today, as privacy seems to lose popularity 
with the development of more complex technological systems, anonymity 
must be safeguarded and privacy laws reviewed with modern glasses.124 
IV. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise[s] have 
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is 
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’” 125  
Although Professor Warren and Justice Brandeis were referring to the 
advances in photographic technology, the same statement applies today, 
perhaps more appropriately than it did a century ago:  “In the past hundred 
years, in increasing numbers, Americans have turned to the law to help them 
defend and control their public images.”126  Street photography announced its 
sequel, one that is more covert, more sophisticated, and vastly more 
intrusive:  face recognition.127  “Face recognition is a subset of biometrics, a 
119. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 191. 
120. See Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476, 478. 
121. See id. at 478. 
122. Id. 
123. See Nussenzweig v. DiCorcia, No. 108446/05, 2006 WL 304832, at *8 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2006). 
124. See Walker, supra note 3. 
125. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 195. 
126. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 25, at 
195. 
127. See Blitz, supra note 7, at 1383; Natasha Singer, Consumer Groups Back 
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technology that involves recording and analyzing people’s unique 
physiological characteristics, like their fingerprint ridges or facial features, to 
learn or confirm their identities.” 128   Today, people seek to defend and 
control not only their public images, but also the way in which their personal 
information is acquired and used. 129   Although “[f]acial recognition 
technology was first developed in the 1960s, . . . [it] only recently became 
accurate enough for widespread use.” 130   Facial recognition has indeed 
become widespread—becoming one of the most powerful tracking tools in 
modern technology: 
Face recognition technology works by scanning a photo or video 
still of an unknown face and comparing its unique topography 
against a facial-scan database of people whose names are already 
known.  Because the technology can be used covertly, civil 
liberties advocates say its popularization has the potential to 
undermine people’s ability to conduct their personal business 
anonymously in . . . public spaces.131 
The technology “became famous when it was [used as an experiment 
during] the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa.”132  Facial recognition technology 
has the power to “link a person’s online persona with his or her actual offline 
self at a specific public location,” thus becoming a threat to our ability to 
Whatever one thinks of these impressive technological advances in . . . surveillance, 
they are not accurately described as a mere automated equivalent of human vision 
that captures nothing more than “what any passerby would easily have been able to 
observe.”  Rather, they change public space into something it would not otherwise 
be, something which in a sense preserves and processes records of people’s 
movements and activities in a way that primitive cameras . . . have not done before. 
Blitz, supra note 7, at 1383 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 
2000)). 
128. Singer, supra note 127. 
129. See BARBAS, supra note 1, at 209–10; Singer, supra note 8.  “Facebook in 
2011 introduced Sponsored Stories, a system that enabled advertisers to use Facebook users’ 
likes as product endorsements.  If you liked Coca-Cola on Facebook, for example, Coke could 
then use your name and image in an advertisement. . . .  The company settled with the users 
for [twenty] million.”  BARBAS, supra note 1, at 209–10.  This is similar to the issue of facial 
recognition and mobile apps—i.e., what differentiates these circumstances, where a person 
voluntarily reveals their likes, to that person’s image being published and shared with a larger 
audience?  See id. 
130. Timothy Williams, Facial Recognition Software Moves from Overseas 
Wars to Local Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/us/facial-recognition-software-moves-from-overseas-
wars-to-local-police.html. 
131. Singer, supra note 127; see also Fung, supra note 76. 
132. McCoy, supra note 87, at 476. 
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remain anonymous in public.133  Although the need for a stronger right to 
privacy in the digital world has been the subject of a good deal of 
campaigning and discussion, there is still much work left to be done.134 
A. Comparing the Law 
At common law, “a set of tort rights . . . protect[s] against four types 
of invasion of privacy: . . . (1) intrusion upon one’s seclusion; (2) public 
disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity that places one in a false light before 
the public; and (4) appropriation of one’s name or likeness without 
permission.” 135   As technology advances, however, our current world 
becomes less common, and the common law of invasion of privacy becomes 
less useful in protecting our images.136  As Paul M. Schwartz, Professor of 
Law, notes, “[v]arious limitations that the common law places on each of 
these four branches eliminate their usefulness in responding to violations of 
133. Singer, supra note 8 (“[F]acial recognition technology has the potential to 
provide important benefits and to support a new wave of technological innovation, . . . but it 
also poses consumer privacy challenges.”). 
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; BARBAS, supra note 1, at 210; Singer, supra 
note 127. 
135. Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: 
Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 743, 
777 (2000) (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A (AM LAW. INST. 1977)). 
General Principle:  (1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to 
liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.  (2) The right to privacy 
is invaded by[:]  (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated 
in § 652B; or (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; 
or (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as 
stated in § 652E. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652A–D.  “[E]ach [of the four torts] involves 
interference with the interest of the individual in leading, to some reasonable extent, a 
secluded and private life, free from the prying eyes, ears, and publications of others.”  Id. § 
652A. 
136. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 777–78; see also McClurg, supra note 6, at 
1008 (citing to Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Ohio 1983)). 
Consider the case of the three boys who were photographed without 
their consent while they spoke with a policewoman on a public sidewalk.  The 
photo subsequently appeared in Playboy magazine next to nude photos of the 
policewoman, and the three boys sued the magazine for invasion of privacy.  Their 
position evokes sympathy.  It seems wrong for one to secretly photograph a person 
without his consent and then to disseminate the photo to a wide audience, 
particularly in a manner and publication many would find objectionable.  However, 
the court held that the facts fell short of satisfying the requirements of any of the 
four invasion of privacy torts and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint.  The court 
ruled that no intrusion occurred because the photo was taken on a public sidewalk 
‘in plain view of the public eye.’ 
McClurg, supra note 6, at 1008. 
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/3
2017] FROM STREET PHOTOGRAPHY TO FACE RECOGNITION 255 
privacy in cyberspace.”137  To further illustrate the weakness of current laws, 
it is useful to contrast American jurisprudence regarding privacy against that 
of other countries: 
American laws do not protect the right to one’s public image and 
persona as extensively as in other parts of the world.  In some 
European countries, under certain conditions, newspapers or 
websites can be forbidden from publishing ostensibly newsworthy 
pictures of people, or facts in public record, without the subject’s 
authorization.  This broad protection of public image would be 
unimaginable in the United States.  Since the 1940s, the image 
torts have been substantially constrained by freedom of speech and 
press, and it is difficult to recover under them.  Despite this, the 
laws of image remain alive, not only on court dockets but in legal 
culture—in Americans’ beliefs about the law, the legal system, and 
their legal rights and entitlements.138 
In Karo, the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “[i]t is the 
exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment, not their mere existence.” 139   Facial recognition does not 
merely exist; rather, it is being used rather aggressively and “remains largely 
unregulated in the United States.” 140   Further, the majority reasoning in 
Nader noted that “extensive public surveillance can reveal hidden details that 
would not ordinarily be observed by others. . . .  The court did not recognize 
the surveillance as a harm itself—only surveillance that destroyed secrecy 
represented an actionable harm.”141  The sole function of facial recognition is 
destroying people’s secrecy.142  Advocates of privacy, amidst the growing 
danger of invasion, are aware of these risks and have begun to propose 
necessary regulations.143  During an event organized by the White House in 
which technology industry experts and consumer advocates confronted the 
issue of facial recognition, “[p]articipants . . . agreed to endorse notices that 
app[lication]s could display before they were downloaded, alerting users if 
137. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 777–78. 
138. BARBAS, supra note 1, at 5. 
139. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
140. Jeff John Roberts, Facebook and Google Really Want to Kill This Face-
Scanning Law, FORTUNE (June 30, 2016, 10:17 AM), 
http://www.fortune.com/2016/06/30/facebook-google-facial-recognition-lawsuits/. 
141. Solove, supra note 11, at 498–99 (citing Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 
N.E.2d 765, 769, 771 (N.Y. 1970)). 
142. See Singer, supra note 8; Singer, supra note 127. 
143. See Singer, supra note 8; Singer, supra note 127. 
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an app[lication] collected material, like photos or contact lists, from their 
phones.”144  Further: 
In 2012, the Obama administration [announced] a plan for a 
consumer privacy bill of rights.  Among other things, the report 
called for the Commerce Department to [organize] a series of 
multi-stakeholder processes in which trade and advocacy groups 
were to create industry codes of conduct for the use of drones, 
data-mining by mobile apps, and other consumer-tracking 
technologies.145   
Few of their efforts, however, have been successful, as companies 
like Google and Facebook make it difficult for legal reform by pouring 
money into lobbying and litigation: 
In the last [sixteen] months, the two sides had been 
meeting periodically under the auspices of the National 
Telecommunications & Information Administration, a division of 
the Commerce Department.  But the privacy advocates said they 
were giving up on talks because they could not achieve what they 
consider minimum rights for consumers—the idea that companies 
should seek and obtain permission before employing face 
recognition to identify individual people on the street.  ‘At a base 
minimum, people should be able to walk down a public street 
without fear that companies [they have] never heard of are 
tracking their every movement—and identifying them by name—
using facial recognition technology . . . .  Unfortunately, we have 
been unable to obtain agreement even with that basic, specific 
premise.’146 
The state of California, the mecca of technology development and 
the place “where many businesses that use [facial] recognition technology 
are located,” has failed to enact any pertinent regulation;  “the most recent 
attempt to pass a biometric information law died in committee.” 147  
Fortunately, several states like Texas and Illinois continue to fight for 
reform, enacting laws to allow citizens some degree of control over their 
images by requiring companies to notify people and obtain their permission 
before taking facial scans or sharing their biometric information.148  Illinois’ 
144. Singer, supra note 8. 
145. Singer, supra note 127. 
146. Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 140. 
147. Sarafa et al., supra note 12. 
148. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b) (2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
503.001 (West 2015); see also Russell Brandom, Someone’s Trying to Gut America’s 
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Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) is “a simple law, requiring a 
person’s explicit consent before” his biometric information is taken.149  Its 
strength, however, is the fact that it allows for a private right of action.150  
“[S]ince the law was first passed, [facial recognition technology has] become 
a central part of products like Google Photos, Snapchat filters, and 
Facebook’s photo-tagging system.” 151   Under Illinois law, “[a]ll three 
companies are currently facing lawsuits for allegedly violating [BIPA], 
producing biometric face prints without notifying Illinois citizens.” 152  
Consequently, the law has proven to be a nuisance for technology giants like 
Google and Facebook. 153   According to a recent article, under BIPA, 
“companies that collect biometric identifiers without consent can be forced 
to pay $1,000 or $5,000 for each violation,” or, if the class action lawsuits 
were to succeed, “they could force the companies to pay millions of dollars 
in damages and, in what would likely be a greater nuisance, force them to 
change their policies around how they use faces.”154 
Strongest Biometric Privacy Law, VERGE (May 27, 2016, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2016/5/27/11794512/facial-recognition-law-illinois-facebook-
google-snapchat; Sarafa et al., supra note 12 (“Texas has statutory provisions addressing 
biometric data, but only the Texas attorney general can bring an action to enforce the statute 
and collect a civil penalty.”). 
149. Brandom, supra note 148. 
No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, 
or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric 
information, unless it first:  (1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally 
authorized representative in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric 
information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject or the subject’s 
legally authorized representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of 
term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, 
stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the 
biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized 
representative. 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b). 
150. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2015); Sarafa et al., supra note 12. 
151. Brandom, supra note 148. 
152. Id.; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b)(1)–(3). 
153. Roberts, supra note 140; see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b). 
[O]n April 1, 2015, a class action was filed against Facebook Inc. in the Circuit 
Court of Cook County, Illinois, seeking to extend the reach of the BIPA.  The 
plaintiff claims that Facebook’s Photo Tag Suggest function—which analyzes 
photos uploaded by users and suggests which of the user’s Facebook friends is 
pictured—runs afoul of the act because it relies on facial recognition software to 
scan uploaded photos and extract and compare unique biometric facial 
characteristics.  This claim is made despite the fact that this technology is not being 
used for financial transactions or security screenings and does not collect biometric 
information directly—it does so only through photos. 
Sarafa et al., supra note 12. 
154. Roberts, supra note 140 (“Earlier this year, the online scrapbook company 
Shutterfly . . . quietly settled a case that alleged its face-scanning violated the law.”); see also 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15, 20. 
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In Germany, where online privacy enjoys much more protection than 
in other countries, facial recognition technology has faced many legal 
challenges.155   In 2011, German officials responded with legal action to 
privacy threats posed by facial recognition technology employed by 
Facebook.156  Johannes Caspar, a Hamburg data protection official, stated: 
The legal situation is clear in my opinion . . . .  If the data were to 
get into the wrong hands, then someone with a picture taken on a 
mobile phone could use biometrics to compare the pictures and 
make an identification . . . .  Such a system could be used by 
undemocratic governments to spy on the opposition or by security 
services around the world.  The right to anonymity is in danger . . . 
.157 
According to Caspar, “[t]he software offered potential for 
considerable abuse and was illegal.”158  Although Facebook responded in 
opposition, saying that users can easily disable its facial recognition feature, 
it failed to capture the essence of German data protection law:  express 
consent.159  Caspar, in a different interview, discussed an essential aspect of 
Facebook’s policy that made its use of the intruding technology more 
troublesome:  The inability for a user to expressly consent to storage of their 
personal data.160  “[W]e have demanded that biometric data be stored with 
the subject’s express consent.  At first any company has to ask whether the 
user wants his or her data stored or not.  Facebook just gives [users] the 
possibly to opt-out.  If you [do not] opt-out, [you are] not consenting.”161  
This policy of express consent by users remains at the core of German data 
protection laws and should be mirrored in the United States.162  People want 
155. Helen Pidd, Facebook Facial Recognition Software Violates Privacy 





158. Id.; see also Cyrus Farivar, Facebook Violates German Law, Hamburg 
Data Protection Official Says, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.dw.com/en/facebook-violates-german-law-hamburg-data-protection-official-
says/a-15290120 [http://dw.com/p/129eq] (“Germany has among some of the strictest data 
protection and privacy laws in the European Union, largely created in the wake of 
informational abuses perpetrated by the Nazis and the Stasi, the East German secret police.”). 
159. Farivar, supra note 158. 
160. See id. 
161. Id. 
162. See id.; Roberts, supra note 140. 
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to protect information that makes them vulnerable to potential violent 
crimes.163   
In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,164 the defendant was seemingly 
obsessed with Amy Lynn Boyer.165  He purchased Boyer’s social security 
number and employment address, among other information, from a database 
company called Docusearch.166  The man went to Boyer’s workplace, waited 
for her to leave, and murdered her.167  The court concluded that, “threats 
posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the risk of 
criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in disclosing a third person’s personal 
information to a client.”168  While it may be feasible to expect an individual 
investigator to exercise reasonable care in sharing one’s personal 
information, expecting multi-million dollar companies to adhere to this 
standard is not.169  The only foreseeable solution is requiring express consent 
from users before these companies can sell and distribute their intimate 
information.170 
B. Inaccuracy and Risks 
Although street photography is intrusive, especially if the image is 
later published and distributed, it does not run the risk of inaccuracy.171  
Courts have held that street photography, despite its possible negative 
163. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003). 
164. 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003). 
165. See id. at 1005–06. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1006. 
On October 15, 1999, [the defendant] drove to Boyer’s workplace and 
fatally shot her as she left work.  [The defendant] then shot and killed himself.  A 
subsequent police investigation revealed that [he] kept firearms and ammunition in 
his bedroom, and maintained a website containing references to stalking and killing 
Boyer as well as other information and statements related to violence and killing. 
Id. 
168. Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1008. 
169. See id.; Roberts, supra note 140. 
170. See FLA. STAT. § 540.08(1) (1997) (“No person shall publish, print, 
display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising 
purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the 
express written or oral consent to such use . . . .”) (emphasis added); Roberts, supra note 140. 
171. See Airton, supra note 30; McClurg, supra note 6, at 1041–43; Mike 
Orcutt, Are Face Recognition Systems Accurate?  Depends on Your Race, MIT TECH. REV. 
(July 6, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601786/are-face-recognition-systems-
accurate-depends-on-your-race/.  It is important to note that the term inaccurate, as used in 
this section, only refers to those photographs that are left untouched after shooting; in other 
words, photographs that have not later been altered or distorted.  Airton, supra note 30; 
Orcutt, supra. 
23
Cuador: From Street Photography To Face Recognition: Distinguishing Betwe
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
260 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
consequences, simply reflects “a public sight which any one present would 
be free to see.”172  Moreover, they have noted that these photographs run 
parallel with the traditional notion that they “do not reveal anything 
private.”173  Although this Comment has suggested that, in some instances, 
street photography does have the ability to reveal intimate details, it does not 
stand for the proposition that the new details can be erroneous.174  Facial 
recognition technology, on the other hand, often presents mistaken 
information.175  Unlike Evans, Bush, and DiCorcia, whose photography did 
not reveal the identity of its subjects, facial recognition does.176  As of June 
2016, “the Government Accountability Office issued a report saying that the 
FBI has not properly tested the accuracy of its face matching system, nor that 
of the massive network of state-level face matching databases it can 
access.”177  Facial recognition not only reveals intimate, personal information 
that is not visible to the naked eye, but it also does so at the risk of being 
wrong, as “people who are not criminal suspects are included in the database, 
and the error rate for the software is as high as [twenty] percent—meaning 
the authorities could misidentify millions of people.” 178   The risk of 
misidentification is even more rampant among minority groups. 179  
According to Anil Jain, head of the biometrics research group at Michigan 
State University: 
The algorithms can also be biased due to the way they are trained . 
. . .  If a gender, age group, or race is underrepresented in the 
training data, that will be reflected in the algorithm’s performance 
. . . .  [After] examin[ing] the performance of several commercially 
available face recognition systems . . . .  The algorithms were 
consistently less accurate on women, African-Americans, and 
younger people.  Apparently they were trained on data that was not 
representative enough of those groups . . . .180 
172. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1139; see also McClurg, supra note 6, at 1008. 
173. Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1140. 
174. Id. at 1149–50.  By new information, this section refers to photography 
that is, for example, presented in a different angle or captured under different lighting, which 
would otherwise not be seen by the average person walking on the street.  Id. at 1136 n.32, 
1149. 
175. Blitz, supra note 7, at 1390 (“[T]est in 2002 showed that even the most 
effective current systems had difficulty identifying faces outdoors—the best recognition rate 
was only [fifty percent] . . . .”). 
176. Cresci, supra note 4; Guarino, supra note 2; Singer, supra note 8; Walker, 
supra note 3. 
177. Orcutt, supra note 171. 
178. Blitz, supra note 7, at 1390; Williams, supra note 130. 
179. See Orcutt, supra note 171. 
180. Id. 
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Other factors can affect the risk of misidentification, such as poor 
image quality, unusual poses or facial expressions, and the age of the 
photograph; the more images a database has, “the greater the chance of such 
errors—either incorrect matches or failure to match photos of people already 
in the database.”181  Advocates of facial recognition technology claim that it 
“is necessary to prevent further terrorist attacks, and it should not be 
dismissed because of a mere potential for abuse.”182  Evidently, the risk is 
more than just the mere potential.183  Facial recognition, despite its chilling 
capacity, receives little attention from federal agencies.184  The technology 
goes beyond that of making a vulgar image public—it can place criminal 
liability on an innocent person.185  In such scenarios, the negative emotional 
consequences on its victim are virtually doubled, as few things can compare 
to the stripping of one’s freedom.186 
V. RECOMMENDATION 
In molding the current laws to encompass modern trends in 
technology, a specific court ruling provides helpful insight. 187   In Daily 
Times Democrat, the court stated that “[t]o hold that one who is involuntarily 
and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose forfeits her right of 
privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public 
scene would be illogical, wrong, and unjust.” 188   This line of reasoning, 
although intuitive, only applies to photographs showing subjects in 
embarrassing pose[s].189  In other words, the court’s holdings surrounding 
invasion of privacy generally seem to be more sensitive to the protection of 
people’s physical presence, striving to bury obscene images, or those that 
may seem “offensive to modesty or decency,” more willingly than those 
sharing and publishing the one’s personal information.190   Although this 
Comment would not go as far as proposing face scans as a battery, or a 
181. Mike Orcutt, As It Searches for Suspects, the FBI May Be Looking at You, 
MIT TECH. REV. (June 23, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601738/as-it-searches-
for-suspects-the-fbi-may-be-looking-at-you/; Orcutt, supra note 171. 
182. McCoy, supra note 87, at 483. 
183. See Orcutt, supra note 171; Walker, supra note 3. 
184. See Williams, supra note 130 (“There is very little oversight on the local 
level, and little concern from the federal agencies providing the grants.”). 
185. See Orcutt, supra note 181; Williams, supra note 130; Zeronda, supra 
note 7, at 1150. 
186. See Williams, supra note 130; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1154. 
187. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 478 (Ala. 1964). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 477–78. 
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complete ban on facial recognition technology, civil law must provide a 
means to place liability on those who, without consent, take a scan of one’s 
image or body. 191   It is crucial that facial recognition technology is 
recognized as able to capture information that is just as intimate as an image 
of our physical bodies, and thus considered a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.192 
In an article by The New York Times, some regulators expressed that 
“Congress [should] pass a law giving consumers basic rights to control how 
intimate details about them are collected and used, no matter the 
technology.”193  Terms like unique topography, DNA, and genetic data, are 
just a few of the descriptors of the sort of information captured by facial 
recognition technology.194  It would be illogical, wrong, and unjust to treat 
the threat of facial recognition technology different from the threat of being 
physically exposed in an image.195  Equally as important as recognizing its 
capabilities is understanding that the technology is still quite new—“so new 
that experts say they are unaware of major legal challenges.”196  To say that 
the use of facial recognition technology is not a violation “because there are 
no reasonable expectations of privacy in public places and facial-recognition 
technology is used in public places,” fails to see the second part of the issue,  
the revelation of secret information that is not, in fact, visible to the naked 
eye.197 
To further claim that “[f]acial-recognition technology is . . . similar 
to fingerprinting,” also fails to acknowledge a key difference:  Fingerprinting 
is rarely done without the person’s consent, whereas facial recognition asks 
for no permission.198  The executive director of the Center on Privacy and 
Technology at Georgetown Law expressed this same notion of innate 
wrongness surrounding facial recognition technology:  “What the FBI is 
doing may be legal, but it [is not] right.”199  He added, “I know what I touch, 
and I certainly know if I give fingerprints for a background check . . . [but] I 
191. See McCoy, supra note 87, at 483; Zeronda, supra note 7, at 1156 (“While 
the First Amendment could still serve as a defense against a battery claim, characterizing 
street shootings as battery might mitigate the problems that result when privacy rights are 
pitted against the right to freedom of expression.”). 
192. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; e.g., Roberto Iraola, New Detection 
Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 30 (2002); Singer, supra note 8; 
Singer, supra note 127. 
193. Singer, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
194. See Singer, supra note 127; Singer, supra note 8. 
195. Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 478. 
196. Williams, supra note 130. 
197. McCoy, supra note 87, at 487. 
198. Id. at 489. 
199. Fung, supra note 76. 
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[do not] think [there is] anyone who keeps track of every surveillance or 
smartphone camera.”200  In 2013, Boston authorities tested facial recognition 
technology but felt that an instinctual wrong would be done to its citizens if 
they adopted it as a tool in their investigations;  “‘I [do not] want people to 
think [we are] always spying on them,’ said William B. Evans, Boston’s 
police commissioner.”201  Ultimately, they decided not to use it, “saying it 
crossed an ethical line.”202  Since there is no feasible way for the average 
citizen to know where all surveillance cameras are located, express consent 
must be required.203 
VI. CONCLUSION
A Wall Street Journal poll in 1999 asked individuals what concerned 
them most about the next century from a list of options.204  “Threats to 
personal privacy came in at the top of the list—ahead of terrorism, the 
destruction of the environment, and overpopulation.” 205   The same poll 
showed that “[n]inety-five percent of Americans would be uncomfortable 
about a [w]ebsite creating a profile that included [their] real name as well as 
additional personal information.”206  Their fears are now a reality, and the 
technology behind it is virtually unstoppable.207  In trying to explain the 
severity of disclosure, this Comment does not undermine freedom of speech 
as another detriment:  “Although protecting against disclosure does limit 
freedom of speech, [unconsented] disclosure . . . inhibit[s] the very interests 
[that] free speech protects.208  Protection from disclosure, like free speech, 
promotes individual autonomy.”209  It is imperative that the law recognizes 
technological advances and adapts to their changes as it has done throughout 
history.210 
200. Orcutt, supra note 181. 
201. Williams, supra note 130. 
202. Id. 
203. See id. 
204. Christy Harvey, Optimism Outduels Pessimism: Breakthroughs in 
Medicine, Technology Are Forecast; But the Auto Is Still Here, WALL STREET J., Sept. 16, 
1999, at A10; see also Schwartz, supra note 135, at 744 n.2. 
205. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 744 n.2. 
206. Id.; see also Harvey, supra note 209. 
207. Heath, supra note 5. 
208. Solove, supra note 11, at 532–33. 
209. Id. at 532–33 (pointing to several consequences suffered by victims of 
disclosure, such as preventing them from engaging in activities that further their own self-
development, threatening their security, and making them a prisoner of their recorded past). 
210. See McClurg, supra note 6, at 1074. 
As technology progressed, the law took cognizance of the fact that new forms of 
communication such as radio and television could cause harm as great or greater 
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According to the company behind the technology in FindFace, 
NTechLab, “widespread facial recognition [is] an inevitable reality—for 
better or for worse.”211  The company hopes that “everyone [will] have the 
ability to find someone online, not just governments and big tech[nology] 
companies.”212  When NTechLab reaches its objective, it is crucial that the 
appropriate laws are in place to protect the citizens of the United States and 
preserve their ever diminishing right to privacy.213 
than written words.  The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized 
this development by defining libel broadly to include, in addition to written words, 
“any . . . form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities 
characteristic of written or printed words.” 
Id. (alteration in original). 
211. Heath, supra note 5. 
212. Id. 
213. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 761 (“‘[P]rivacy is not only a personal 
predilection, though it may be that, too.  It is a requirement of social systems.’  Information 
privacy does not derive from the state of nature or an inborn capacity of autonomy, but 
depends on its essential relation to the health of a democratic society.”). 
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